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Abstract
An evolutionary trade network game (TNG)
is proposed for studying the interplay between
evolutionary game dynamics and preferential
partner selection in various market contexts
with distributed adaptive agents. The modu
lar form of the TNG facilitates experimenta
tion with alternative specifications for trade
p^tner matching, trading, expectation updat
ing, and trade strategy evolution. Experimental
results obtained using a C-t-f implementation
suggest that the conventional optimality prop
erties used to evaluate agent matching mecha
nisms in static market contexts may be inad
equate measures of optimality from an evolu
tionary perspective.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game studies typically focuS on the opti
mality properties of strategy configurations when agents
are matched randomly or deterministically by some ex
traneous device. The optimality properties of the match
ing mechanism per se are generally not considered ([11],
[14]). In contrast, optimal search studies focus on the
optimahty properties of preference-based agent match
ing mechanisms, but generally these studies are set in
static contexts [18]. Since actual social interactions are
often characterized both by evolutionary dynamics and
by preference-based partner selection, studying both as
pects together seems a logical and interesting next step
to take.
This issue is addressed in Stanley et al. [20]. The stan
dard evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is
extended to an evolutionary IPD with choice and refusal
(IPD/CR) by allowingplayers to choose and refuse game
*To appear in the Proceedings Volume of the Fifth Annual Con
ference on Evolutionary Programming, MIT Press, 1996. The au
thor is grateful.to D. Fogel, M. Smucker and N. Vriend for helpful
comments.
partners in each iteration on the basis of continually up
dated expected payoffs.^
The introduction of choice and refusal fundamentally
alters the way in which players interact in the IPD
and the characteristics that result in high payoff scores.
Choice allows players to increase their chances of encoun
tering other cooperative players, and refusal gives play
ers a way to protect themselves from defections without
having to defect themselves. The ostracism of defectors
occurs endogenously as an increasing number of players
individually refuse the defectors' game offers. Neverthe
less, choice and refusal also permit opportunistic players
to home in quickly on exploitable players and form par
asitic relationships.
The computer experiments reported in [20] and in
the subsequent studies by Ashlock et al. [1], Smucker
et al. [19], and Hauk [8] indicate that the emergence of
mutual cooperation in the standard evolutionary IPD
is accelerated by the introduction of preferential choice
and refusal of partners. The underlying player interac
tion patterns induced by choice and refusal can be com
plex and highly path dependent, however, even when
expressed play behavior is largely cooperative. Conse
quently, it has proved difficult to characterize the map
ping from parameter configurations to evolutionary out
comes for the IPD/CR.
A potentially useful way to proceed, then, is to focus
on more concrete settings which impose problem-specific
constraints on agent interactions. In Tesfatsion [22] an
evolutionary trade network game (TNG) is proposed
for studying the interplay between evolutionary dynam
ics and preferential partner selection under alternatively
^Other game theory studies focusing on the endogenous deter
mination of player interaction patterns, e.g., by permitting avoid
ance of unwanted interactions, endogenously determined proba
bilities of interaction, or evolution of interaction lengths, include
Fogel [5], Gurievand Shakhova [7], Hirshleifer and Rasmusen [9],
Kitcher [12], Mailath et al. [13], ^d Orbell and Dawes [17]. There
is also a growing body of work by economists on multi-agent sys
tems with endogenous interactions. See, for example, Brock and
Durlauf[2], De Vany [3], Durlauf [4], Io:^des [10], and Vriend (23).
specified market structures.
The player set for the TNG consists of buyer and seller
tradebots who choose and refuse trade partners on the
basis of continuously updated expected payoffs. Buyers
make trade offers to preferred sellers which the sellers
either accept or refuse. A trade offer is an invitation to
engage in a risky trade modelled as a two-player game.
Each buyer and seller initially associates a prior expected
payoff with each potential trade partner and randomly
adopts a strategy for use in subsequent trades. The buy
ers and sellers then enter into a trade cycle loop consist
ing of successive rounds of partner matching, resource-
constrained trading, and updating of expected payoffs.
At the end of the trade cycle loop the buyers and sellers
enter into an evolutionary step in which trade strate
gies successfiil in past trades are retained while trade
strategies unsuccessful in past trades are replaced with
variants of niore successful strategies. A new trade cycle
loop then commences.
The modular form of the TNG facilitates experi
mentation with alternative specifications for trade part
ner matching, trading, expectation updating, and trade
strategy evolution. This paper presents experimental re
sults obtained for the peirticular TNG module specifi
cations developed in Tesfatsion [22], using a recently
completed C++ implementation (McFadzean and Tes
fatsion [16]). As will be clarified in the following section,
trade partners are determined in accordance with a "de
ferred choice and refusal" (DCR) mechanism, a modified
Gale-Shapley matching mechanism [6] that retains the
static optimality properties of the original Gale-Shapley
mechanism. Also, expected payoffs are updated by means
of a simple learning algorithm that yields consistent esti
mates. A trade is modelled as a prisoner's dilemmagame,
and trade (IPD) strategies are evolved by means of a
standardly specified genetic algorithm.
Two types ofmarkets are considered: buyer-seller mar
kets, and two-sided markets. In the buyer-seller market,
each tradebot is both a buyer and a seller in the sense
that he can both make and receive trade offers. In the
two-sided mzirket, the set of buyers (tradebots who can
make offers) is disjoint from the set ofsellers (tradebots
who can receive offers). For each type of market, atten
tion is focused on the average fitness score achieved by
the tradebots as the market evolves and the degree to
which they display mutually cooperative behavior.
One interesting finding concerns the high transaction
costs that agents can suffer under Gale-Shapley type
matching mechanisms due to large numbers of refused
offers. Specifically, for certain parameter specifications,
the refusal payoffs accumulated under the DCR mech
anism in both buyer-seller and two-sided markets can
result in lower average fitness scores for the tradebots rel
ative to other less sophisticated matching mechanisms.
Another interesting finding concerns theevolutionary ef
fects of the bias of Gale-Shapley type matching mecha
nisms in favor of those who actively make offers. Under
the DCR mechanism, which inherits this bias, buyers in
two-sided markets with relatively large seller acceptance
quotas appear to be able to form long-term parasitic re
lations with sellers that reduce seller fitnesses relative to
buyer fitnesses and hinder the emergence of mutually co
operative behavior. Overall, these experimental findings
suggest that the conventional optimality properties used
to evaluate agent matching mechanisms in static market
contexts may be inadequate measures of optimality from
an evolutionary perspective.
The TNG module specifications are detailed in Sec
tion 2, and various experimental results are reported in
Section 3.
2 The TNG Model
The set of players for the TNG is the union V = BUS of
a nonempty subset B of buyer tradebots who can submit
trade offers and a nonempty subset S of seller tradebots
who can receive trade offers, where B and S may be dis
joint, overlapping, or coincident. For example, the buy
ers and sellers might represent customers and retail store
owners, workers and employers, borrowers and lenders,
or auction traders.
Each generation of tradebots participates in a trade
cycle hop consisting of a fixed number of trade cycles.
In each trade cycle, each buyer m can submit up to
trade offers to sellers, eind each seller n can accept up
to An trade offers from buyers, where Om and An are
strictly positive. One interpretation for the buyer offer
quota Om is that buyer m has a limited amount of re
sources (credit, labor time, collateral,...) to trade in ex
change for other items, and one interpretation for the
seller acceptance 'quota An is that seller n has a lim
ited amount of items (goods, job openings, loans,...) to
provide.
The tradebots determine their submission, acceptance,
and refusal of trade offers in each trade cycle using a
modifed version of the well-known Gale-Shapley deferred
acceptance mechanism [6]. This modifiedmechanism, re
ferred to below as the deferred choice and refusal (DCR)
mechanism, presumes that each buyer and seller asso
ciates an expected payoff with each potential trade part
ner. (The way in which these expected payoffs are deter
mined is clarified below.) Also, each buyer and seller is
presumed to have an exogenously given minimum toler
ance level, in the sense that hewill not trade with anyone
whose expected payoff lies below this level.
The DCR mechanism then proceeds as follows. Each
buyer m first makes trade offers to a maximum of Om
most-preferred sellers he finds tolerable, with at most
one offer going to any one seller. Each seller n in turn
forms a waiting list consisting of a maximum of An of
the most preferred trade offers he has received to date
from tolerable buyers; all other trade offers are refused.
For both buyers and sellers, selection among equally pre
ferred options is settled by a random draw. If a buyer has
a trade offer refused, he immediately submits a replace
ment trade offer to any tolerable next-most-preferred
seller that has not yet refused him. A seller receiving a
new trade offer that dominates a trade offer currently on
his waiting list substitutes this new trade offer in place of
the dominated trade offer, which is then refused. A buyer
ceases making trade offers when either he has no further
trade offers refused or all tolerable sellers have refused
him. When all trade offers cease, each seller accepts all
buyer trade offers currently on his waiting list.^
The buyer-seller matching outcomes generated by the
DCR mechanism exhibit the usual optimality proper
ties associated with Gale-Shapley type matching mecha
nisms. First, any such matching outcome is core stable,
in the sense that no subset of tradebots has an incen
tive to block the matching outcome by engaging in a
feasible rearrangement of trade partners among them
selves [22, Proposition 4.2]. Second, define a'matching
outcome to be B-optimal if it is core stable and if each
buyer matched under the matching outcome is at least
as well off as he would be under any other core stable
matching outcome. Then, in each TNG trade cycle, the
DCR mechanism yields the unique B-optimal matching
outcome as long as each tradebot has a strict preference
order over the potential trade partners he finds tolerable
[22, Proposition 4.3].
During the DCR matching process, any tradebot that
has a trade offer refused is immediately penalized by re
ceipt of a negative refusal payoff, R\ the tradebot who
does the refusing is not penaUzed. If a tradebot neither
submits nor accepts euiy trade offers during this match
ing process, he receives a wallflower payoff, W.
A trade offer is an offer by a buyer to a seller to partic
ipate in a risky trade modelled as a prisoner's dilemma
(PD) game. For example, the trade may involve the ex
change of a good or service of a certain promised quality
in return for a loan or wage contract entailing various
payment obligations. A buyer participating in a trade
may either cooperate (fulfill his trade obUgations) or de
fect (renege on his trade obligations), and" similarly for
a seller. The range of possible payoffs is the same for
each trade in each trade cycle; namely, L (the sucker
payoff) is the lowest possible payoff, received by a co
operative tradebot whose trade partner defects; D is the
payoff receivedby a defecting tradebot whose trade part
ner also defects; C is the payoff received by a coopera
tive tradebot whose trade partner also cooperates; and
H (the temptation payoff) is the highest possible pay
off, received by a defecting tradebot whose trade partner
^Note that theDCRmechanism requires the tradebots to pass
messages back and forth to each other at event driven times.
Player 1
d
Player 2
c d
(C.C) (L,H)
(H,L) (D,D)
Table 1. Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game
cooperates. More precisely, the payoffs are assumed to
satisfy L < D <^ < C < H, with {L + H)/2 < C. The
payoff matrix for the PD game is depicted in Table 1.
The trade behavior of each tradebot, whether he is a
pure buyer in V —5, a buyer-seller in 5 n 5, or a pure
seller in V —5, is characterized by a iinite-memory pure
strategy for playing a PD game with an arbitrary partner
an indefinite number of times, hereafter referred to as a
trade strategy. Each tradebot thus has a distinct trading
personality even if he engages in both buying and selling
activities. No tradebot knows any other tradebot's strat
egy a priori; he can only learn about it by engaging the
other tradebot in repeated trades and observing the pay
off history that ensues. Moreover, each tradebot's choice
of an action in a current trade with a potential trade
partner is determined entirely on the basis of the payoffs
obtained in past trades with this same partner.
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle loop, before
any actual trades have taken place, each tradebot v asso
ciates an exogenously given prior expected payoff U^{k)
with each potential trade partner k. Throughout each
trade cycle, tradebot v then uses a simple variable-gain
criterion filter [21] to update his current expected payoffs
on the basis of the new payoffs he obtains from interac
tions with his potential trade partners. In particular, if
tradebot v receives a payoff P from an interaction with
a potential trade partner k, then v forms an updated ex
pected payoff for k by taking a convex combination of
this new payoffP and his previous expected payofffor k,
where the inverse of the weight on P is 1 plus tradebot
u's current payoff count with k. In this way, tradebot
Vkeeps a running tab on the payoff outcomes of his in
teractions with k. As explained in Tesfatsion [22, Section
5], this updating procedure guarantees that the expected
payofftradebot v associates with k converges to the true
average payoff v attains from interactions with k as the
number of interactions between v and k becomes arbi
trarily large.
At the end of a trade cycle loop, the fitness score of
each tradebot is calculated as the average of all of the
trade, refusal, and wallflower payoffs he received dur-
int main () {
tnglnit() ;
For (G = 0,...,GMAX-1) {
For (I = 0 IMAX-1) {
MatchTraders();
Trade();
UpdateExpO;
)
AssessFitness();
If (G < GMAX-1) {
EvolveGen();
}
}
Return 0 ; }
// Construct initial tradebots
// with prior expected payoffc..
// Enter the generation loop.
// Enter the trade cycle loop.
// Determine trade partners,
// given expected payoffs,
// and record refusal and
// wallflower payofls.
// Implement trades and
// record trade payoffs.
// Update expected payoffs
// using newly recorded payoffs.
// Record fitness scores.
// Genetic step: Evolve the
II current tradebots.
Table 2. TNG Pseudo Code
ing this loop. The tradebots then enter into a genetic
sief in which the trade strategies used by the eliit (the
fittest tradebots) are retained while the strategies used
by the remaining tradebots are' replaced with variants of
the strategies used by the elite. The finite state machine
(FSM) and genetic algorithm (GA) used in the genetic
step to represent and evolve the tradebots' trade strate
gies are the same as detailed in Ashlock et al. [1, Sec
tion 2.3] for player strategies in the IPD/CR except that
two-point rather than one-point cross-over is employed
to avoid endpoint bias effects. The particular FSM and
GA parameter settings used in all experiments reported
in this paper are detailed in the next section.
At the end of the genetic step the memories of the
tradebots are reset to zero, their associated FSMs are
reset to a fixed initial state, and their expected payoffs
are reset to the prior expected payoff levels. A new trade
cycle loop then commences. Table 2 depicts the overall
logical progression of the TNG in pseudo-code.
Before reporting on some of the TNG computer ex
periments conducted to date, three special cases of the
TNG will be sketched to indicate the range of economic
applications it encompasses.
Case 1: A Labor Market Modelled as an Assignment
Game with Choice and Refusal
The set B consists of workers and the set S consists of
employers, where B and S are disjoint. Each worker m
can make work offers to a maximum of Om employers, or
he can choose to be unemployed and receive the known
payoff W. Each employer n can hire up to An work
ers, and employers can refuse work offers. Once matched,
a worker and employer engage in work site interactions
modelled as a PD game.
This TNG special case extends the usual assignment
problem [18] by incorporating subsequent strategic game
play between matched pairs of agents and by having
game play iterated over time. Assignment problems are
commonly used by economists to model job-matching in
labor markets as well as other economic processes, but
the payoff outcome for each matched pair of agents is
usually specified a priori.
Case 2: A Labor Market with Endogenously Determined
Workers and Employers
The subsets B and S coincide, implying that each
tradebot can both make and receive trade offers. Each
tradebot v can make up to Oy work offers to tradebots at
other work sites and receive up to A^ work offers at his
own work site. The degree to which any accepted work
offer results in satisfactory outcomes for the participant
tradebots is determined by subsequent PD game play.
Ex post, four pure types of tradebots can emerge: (1)
pure workers, who work at the sites of other tradebots
but have no tradebots working for them at their own
sites; (2) pure employers, who have tradebots working
for them at their own sites but who do not work at the
sites of other tradebots; (3) unemployed tradebots, who
make at lecist one work offer to a tradebot at another site
but who end up neither working at other sites nor having
tradebots working for them at their own sites; and (4)
inactive (out of the work force) tradebots, who neither
make nor accept any work offers.
Case 3: Intermediation with Choice and Refusal
The buyer subset B and the seller subset S overlap
but do not coincide. The pure buyers in V —S are the
depositors (lenders), the buyer-sellers in B n S are the
intermediaries (banks), and the pure sellers in V —B
are the capital investors (borrowers). The depositors of
fer funds to the intermediaries in return for deposit ac
counts, and the intermediaries offer loan contracts to the
capital investors in return for a share of earnings. The
degree to which accepted offers are satisfactorily fulfilled
is determined by subsequent PD game play.
3 TNG Experiments
Four types of computer experiments are discussed in the
present section: (a) buyer-seller market experiments with
sellers unconstrained by acceptance quotas; (b) buyer-
seller market experiments with seller acceptance quotas
set to 1; (c) two-sided market experiments with sell
ers unconstrained by acceptance quotas; and (d) two-
sided market experiments with seller acceptance quo
tas set to 1. All experimental findings reported below
were obtained using TNG, a C-f4- trade platform devel
oped by McFadzean and Tesfatsion [16], which is sup
ported by the C4-+ abstract base classes developed by
McFadzean [15] for a general artificial life platform, Sim-
BioSys. These findings are preliminary in the sense that
only average fitness scores are considered. A more thor
oughunderstanding of these findings will require delving
more deeply into the underlying trade patterns and the
trade strategies that support these trade patterns.
For each type of experiment, multiple runs from dif
ferent initial random seeds are reported. The following
features ate set commonly across all of these experimen
tal runs. The wallflower payoff W is set at 0, the re
fusal payoff R is set at —0.6, the PD trade payoffs ate
set at i = —1.6, D = —0.6, C = 1.4, and H = 3.4,
and each tradebot's minimum tolerance level is set at
0. Each tradebot assigns the same prior expected pay
off, = C, to each other tradebot, implying that he
is initially indifferent concerning which trade partners
he interacts with; and each tradebot assigns a negative
prior expected payoff to himself, thus ensuring that he
never trades with himself. Each buyer tradebot has an
offer quota of 1, meaning that he can have at most one
trade offer outstanding to sellers at any given time. The
total number of tradebots is set at 24, and the 16 most
fit tradebots in each generation are taken to be the elite.
The number of trade cycles in each trade cycle loop is
set at 150, and the number of generations is set at 50.
Each trade strategy is represented by a 16-state FSM
with a fixed initial state and with memory 1. At the be
ginning of the first trade cycle loop, a bit string coding
for each FSM is randomly generated. At the end of each
trade cycle loop, the current population of trade strate
gies (FSMs coded as bit strings) is evolved by means of
a genetic algorithm employing two-point cross-over and
bit mutation. The probability of cross-over is set at 1.0
and the probability of a bit mutation is set at 0.005.
3.1 Buyer-Seller Market
Each tradebot in these experiments was both a buyer and
a seller, implying that he could both make and receive
trade offers.
In the first batch of buyer-seller experiments, the ac
ceptance quota of each tradebot was set at 24, the total
number of tradebots. Since offer quotas in these experi
ments were set at 1, the tradebots were then effectively
unconstrained with regard to the number of trade offers
they could have on their waiting lists at any given time.
As a benchmark, experiments were first run with ran
dom partner matching in place of the DCR matching
mechanism. Random partner matching was effected by
preventing the updating of the prior expected payoff
= C that each tradebot initially assigned to each
potential trade partner, so that all tradebots remained
indifferent concerning their potential trade partners and
matching was accomplished by the default mechanism
of a random draw. Although occasionally the average
fitness score achieved by the tradebots under random
matching rose to the mutual cooperation level, 1.4, a
more typical outcome was a steady decline to the mu
tual defection level, —0.6; see Fig. 1.® Note that the size
of the refusal payoff is irrelevant for this finding, since
refusals never occur in TNG experiments with random
matching and nonbinding acceptance quotas.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, the
average fitness score achieved by the tradebots typically
evolved to the mutual cooperation level 1.4; see Fig. 2.
These TNG experiments reinforce the previous IPD/CR
findings of Stanley et al. [20] and Ashlock et al. [1] that
a preference-based matching mechanism tends to accel
erate the emergence of mutual cooperation in the IPD
when each agent is permitted both to make and to refuse
game offers, is unconstrained with regard to the number
of received offers he can accept, and is permitted to have
at most one offer outstanding at any given time.
In the second batch ofbuyer-seller experiments, the ac
ceptance quotas were reduced from 24 to 1. Under ran
dom partner matching, the typical outcome was again
the emergence of an average fitness score close to the
mutual defection payoff level, —0.6. This same outcome
obtained even when refusal payoffs were omitted from fit
ness scores, implying that refusal payoffs resulting from
limited waiting lists were not a determining factor.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored,
however, the average fitness score typically leveled out
at about 1.25 instead of evolving to the mutual coopera
tion level of 1.4. The explanation for this finding appears
to be that the nature of the refusal payoffs changes when
the acceptance quota is changed from large to small in
relation to the offer quota.
In TNG experiments with relatively large acceptance
quotas, a tradebot is generally refused by another trade
bot only if the latter finds him to be intolerable because
of past defections. Refusal payoffs received in response
to defections should rightly count against the fitness of
the trade strategies generating the defections, for this in
duces changes in these strategies in the genetic step that
tend to lead to higher future fitness scores. In TNG ex
periments with relatively small acceptance quotas, how
ever, each tradebot can only have a small number of trade
offers on his waiting list at any one time no matter how
many desirable trade offers he receives. Consequently,
the tradebots tend to amass large numbers of negative re
fusal payoffs as a consequence of the low acceptance quo
tas in combination with the DCR mechanism, regardless
of their trade strategies. Since the exogenously given ac
ceptance quotas and DCR mechanism are not evolved in
^As previously noted, the initial population of strategies for
each TNG experiment was randomly generated and each run con
sisted of only 50 generations with interactions between any two
players limited to at most 150 separate encounters per generation.
Thus, this evolution of mutual defection is not in conflict with the
evolution of mutual cooperation observed for the IPD with random
or round-robin matching by previous researchers when the initial
strategy popiilation was sufficiently seeded with cooperatively in
clined strategies such as Tit-for-Tat or when much longer player
interaction lengths were permitted.
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the current implementation of the TNG, penalizing the
tradebots for these quota and DCR effects by including
refusal payoffs in their fitness scores tends to lower their
current average fitness score without inducing a higher
average fitness score in the future.
As expected, the average fitness scores attained by
the tradebots markedly improved when refusal payoffs
were removed from the calculation of the tradebots' fit
ness scores; see Fig. 3. Additional improvement occurred
when the refusal payoffs were reduced in magnitude from
—0.60 to —0.30; but a further reduction in magnitude to
—0.06 and then to 0.0 resulted in increasingly volatile
maximum cind minimum average fitness scores with no
discernable improvement in average fitness scores.
The probable cause of the increased volatility is that
tradebots receiving refusals during initial trade cycles
may have no incentive to direct their offers elsewhere in
subsequent trade cycles if the magnitude of the refusal
payoff is small. With a strictly negative refusal payoff,
the continually updated expected payoff that a trade-
bot associates with another tradebot who repeatedly re
fuses him eventually falls below 0, the minimum toler
ance level, at which point he ceases making offers to this
other tradebot; but this learning process is slow when
refusal payoffs are small in magnitude.
3.2 Two-Sided Market
In each of these experiments, 12 of the tradebots were
pure buyers and the remaining 12 were pure sellers.
In the first batch of experiments, the acceptance quota
of each seller was set at 12 so that sellers were effectively
unconstrained regarding the number of trade offers they
could have on their waiting lists at any one time. Ex
periments were first run with random partner match
ing in place of the DCR matching mechanism to obtain
a benchmark for comparison. Interestingly, in contrast
to buyer-seller experiments with nonbinding acceptance
quotas and random matching, the average fitness score
attained by the tradebots tended to fall to a level be
tween the wallflower payoff 0 and —0.4 rather than drop
ping all the way down to the mutual defection payoff level
—0.6; compare Fig. 4 with Fig. 1.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, the
average fitness score of the tradebots typically evolved to
about 1.2, a payoff level markedly below the mutual co
operation level 1.4 obtained in buyer-seller experiments
with nonbinding acceptance quotas and DCR matching.
Moreover, the maximum fitness score, the average fitness
score, and the minimum fitness score attained by the suc
cessive tradebot generations persistently deviated from
one another. Compare Fig. 5 with Fig. 2.
As discussed in Section 2, the DCR mechanism is only
guaranteed to be optimal for buyers (active makers of
trade offers). Consequently, it is conjectured that the
DCR matching mechanism in two-sided markets with
buyer offer quotas equal to 1 and with nonbinding seller
acceptance quotas results in a "separating equilibrium"
in which the buyers are genercdly achieving high fitness
scores and the sellers are generally achieving low fit
ness scores. In particular, the extreme pickiness of buy
ers combined with the acceptance by sellers of all tol
erable received trade offers appears to allow buyers to
form long-run parasitic relations with sellers, i.e., rela
tions characterized by successful defections within the
limits permitted by the sellers' 0 minimum tolerance lev
els.
In the second batch of two-sided market experiments,
the seller acceptance quotas were decreased from 12 to
1. Under random partner matching, the typical outcome
was the emergence of an average attained fitness score
close to the mutual defection payoff, —0.6, whether or not
refusal payoffs were counted in the calculation of fitness
scores.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored,
with refusal payoffs counted in the calculation of fitness
scores, the accumulation of refusal payoffs tended to re
sult in average attained fitness scores that were markedly
below the mutual cooperation payoff level. When refusal
payoffs were then omitted from the calculation of fit
ness scores, the average attained fitness scores tended to
evolve to the mutual cooperation level and to be close to
the maximum attained fitness scores; see Fig. 6.
Comparing Fig. 6 with Fig. 5, it appears that having
equal buyer and seller quota levels better enables sellers
to protect themselves against potentially parasitic buy
ers, thus ameliorating the bias of the DCR mechanism
in favor of buyers. On the other hand, having seller ac
ceptance quotas that are large relative to the number of
buyers tends to reduce the occurrence of refusal payoffs
due purely to the limited length of waiting lists. Indeed,
in various two-sided market experiments with 12 pure
buyers, 12 pure sellers, and equal buyer and seller quo
tas ranging from 3 to 12, the average attained fitness
scores tended to evolve to the mutual cooperation payoff
level and to be close to the maximum attained fitness
scores even when refusal payoffs were included in the
calculation of individual fitness scores.
4 Concluding Remarks
The experimental findings reported in Section 3 sug
gest several extensions of the TNG. Ideally, the choice
and refusal mechanism should be allowed to evolve con
jointly with the tradebots' trade strategies. Also, the ex-
ogenously specified offer and acceptance quotas should
be allowed to change over time to reflect both changing
strategic considerations and changing budget and pro
duction relations. Finally, the trade stategies for pure
buyers and for pure sellers should be separately evolved
since these tradebots face intrinsically asymmetric choice
problems. It will be interesting to see how Gale-Shapley
type matching mechanisms fare in these less structured
evolutionary contexts.
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